CASE C OMMENTARIES
CONTRACTS—EXERCISING THE OPTION TO PURCHASE
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that where an agreement
provides that transfer of title simultaneously triggers exercise of an
option to purchase property, the option is deemed exercised at the
time the title is transferred where the transferor expects to receive
title to the other property, regardless of whether full payment has
occurred. Additionally, the court is constrained by matters of public
policy and will not enforce a liquidated damages clause when it is
intended to penalize a party in the case of nonpayment. Keck v. Meek,
No. E201701465COAR3CV, 2018 WL 3199220 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28,
2018).

Robert Fritsche
In 2013, Shawn and Marcella Keck (the “Kecks”) sought out E.G.
Meek (“Mr. Meek”), a licensed real estate agent, for the dual purposes of
selling the Kecks property, First Street Property, and purchasing a new
home. During negotiations between the Kecks and Mr. and Mrs. Meek
(the “Meeks”), the parties executed four documents: a lease agreement, a
real estate sales contract, an addendum, and a sale contract (collectively the
“Lease Option Agreement”). After executing these documents, the Kecks
rented the Walnut Breeze Property. On January 6th, 2014, the Kecks meet
with Mr. Meek and executed a warranty deed conveying title of the First
Street Property to the Meeks. However, Mr. Meek did not convey the title
to the Walnut Breeze Property to the Kecks despite promising to do so. In
2015, the Kecks abandoned the Walnut Breeze Property and stopped
paying rent, commencing this action as they had yet to receive the deed
for the Walnut Breeze Property, despite losing their interest in the First
Street Property.
The first issue that the court discussed on appeal was whether the
award of equity by the trial court was appropriate. The Meeks appealed
the trial court’s award, arguing that it was improperly granted as the Kecks
were the first party to breach and there was no effective acceptance of the
option contract. The court dispensed with both of the Meeks’ objections,
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determining that the award of equity was properly granted by the trial
court.
Both parties argued that the other party was the first one to breach the
contract. The Meeks argued that the Kecks committed the first material
breach as they failed to pay rent for three months in 2015.1 Alternatively,
the Kecks contended that the Meeks breached the contract first on January
6th, 2014 when they failed to convey title to the Walnut Breeze Property.
However, the court sidestepped the issue of breach as it held that the
award was not an award of damages under a breach of contract claim, but
rather a return of equity to the Kecks in the First Street Property following
the Kecks’ acceptance of an option to purchase the Walnut Breeze
Property.
As the award hinged on the return of equity, the determinative
question was whether the Kecks had exercised their option to purchase
because if they had not, there could be no equity to return. The Meeks
contended there was no proper acceptance of the lease option contract
and declared that the Kecks did not exercise their option to purchase.
However, the court rejected the Meeks’ interpretation after it determined
that several sections of the Lease Option Contract were ambiguous.
Notably, there was no singular document that the parties identified when
discussing the Lease Option Contract. Instead, the parties collectively
referred to the four separate agreements entered into during their initial
negotiations. The court collectively interpreted these documents together
as “integral parts of the same transaction” that formed the Lease Option
Contract. Id. at *9 (quoting Graber v. Graber, No. W2003-01180-COA-R3CV, 2003 WL 23099689, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003)). When
reviewing the terms within the four separate documents, the court agreed
with the trial court’s determination that the Lease Option Contract was
ambiguous as it was “without any terms specifically outlining that
contract”.2 As there were no clear terms detailing what was to take place
See Madden Phillips Constr., Inc. v. GGAT Dev. Corp., 315 S.W.3d 800, 812
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[A] party who commits the first material breach of contract
may not recover damages for the other party's material breach.”).
2 The Addendum incorporates a “lease option contract,” which it states, “shall be a
preliminary contract as part of this sales contract,” but it does not describe the details
of any lease option contract. The Addendum later refers to “payments made under the
lease/option contract,” which creates an ambiguity as to whether there exists a lease
separate from an option contract or whether the two are identical as a “lease option
contract.” Keck, 2018 WL 3199220, at *9.
1
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in the January 6 transaction or what would constitute effective acceptance
of that transaction, the court held that the document was clearly
ambiguous as “its meaning is uncertain and…it can be fairly construed in
more than one way.” Farmers-Peoples Bank v. Clemmer, 519 S.W.2d 801, 805
(Tenn. 1975). Therefore, the court found that it was necessary to resolve
the ambiguity.
Despite the ambiguous nature of the contract, the Meeks argued
against the trial court’s use of parol evidence by citing to a Tennessee
Court of Appeals case, GRW Enters. v. Davis. 797 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1990). In GRW, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that parol
evidence may not be used to alter, vary, or qualify the plain meaning of
the contract. However, the appellate court in Keck identified numerous
ambiguities on the face of the Lease Option Contract that could not be
resolved from the contract’s plain meaning. Specifically, the court noted
that the terms did not explain what constituted acceptance, identify the
owner that would finance the deal, or provide when title would be
conveyed. Notably, Mr. Meek drafted the agreements himself, and in
Tennessee “it is well settled that ‘ambiguities in a contract are to be
construed against the party drafting it.’” Frank Rudy Heirs Assocs. v. Moore
& Assocs., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Mr. Meek had
the opportunity to clarify these terms when drafting these documents but
failed to do so.
Prior to January 6, the Kecks were leaseholders of the Walnut Breeze
Property. On January 6, the Kecks transferred title of the First Street
Property, believing they were exercising their option to purchase the
Walnut Breeze Property. The Kecks contended their conveyance of title
was effective acceptance of the Lease Option Contract, while the Meeks
rejected that the transfer was effective acceptance and instead argued that
it was a credit. The appellate court rejected the Meeks’ contention that full
payment was a condition of effective acceptance, and instead agreed with
the Kecks’ interpretation that the parties agreed the Kecks would sign over
the deed to the First Street Property and that transfer would
simultaneously exercise the option to purchase the Walnut Breeze
Property. Additionally, the Kecks would use their equity in the First Street
Property as a down payment to purchase the Walnut Breeze Property.
The appellate court also noted that there was equity in the Walnut
Breeze Property created by the monthly payments made by the Kecks
under the Lease Option Agreement that was not included in the trial
court’s award. The parties indicated that payments made by the Kecks
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under the lease agreements would be applied directly toward the Walnut
Breeze Property mortgage. However, the appellate court noted that this
issue was not raised by either party during trial or on appeal. As the issue
was not raised, the appellate court made no further determination on what
equity had accrued. The appellate court’s reasoning demonstrated that it
was not in the business of bailing out plaintiffs who failed to plead with
specificity, and thus a party seeking an award should raise it.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Kecks
exercised their option to purchase the Walnut Breeze Property pursuant
to the “Lease Option Contract” and the award to return the equity in the
Walnut Breeze Property. The appellate court found the award was
consistent with the Keck’s alternative claims for a return of the First Street
Property, as the court had previously held that the “defaulting vendee in a
real estate transaction may recover the amounts paid on the purchase price
in excess of the damages caused by the vendee's breach.” Pickett v. Pickett,
No. 01-A-01-9503-CH-0011, 1995 WL 517492, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Monts v. Campbell, No. 83-205-II (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 6,
1984)).
The Meeks also argued that the liquidated damages provision in the
Lease Option Contract should be applicable as the Kecks had “fail(ed) to
perform the covenant herein contained.” Keck, 2018 WL 3199220, at *15.
Due to the Kecks’ failure to pay rent, the Meeks argued the clause provided
that they should receive “as liquidated damages all sums which have
therefore been paid.” Id. However, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court did not err in declining to award the Meeks the original equity
in the First Street Property as liquidated damages.
The appellate court referenced the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
holding that competing interests of the court allow parties to freely
contract while constraining certain agreements due to public policy
considerations. Chapman Drug Co. v. Chapman, 341 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Tenn.
1960). The Tennessee Supreme Court also recognized that liquidated
damages provide certainty, allow parties to resolve defaults and other
related disputes efficiently, and that the clauses are effective when those
damages reflect a reasonable estimate of potential damages. V.L. Nicholson
Co. v. Transcon Inv. & Fin. Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474, 484 (Tenn. 1980).
However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee also determined that
liquidated damages would be unenforceable against public policy if the
provision and circumstances “indicates that the parties intended merely to
penalize for a break of contract.” Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 99-
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100 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate court found that the liquidated damages
provision proposed by the Meeks exemplified a primarily punitive effect
and was therefore unenforceable under public policy considerations.3
Additionally, the appellate court held that the trial court erred on the
issue of attorney’s fees. The trial court declined to award attorney’s fees
pursuant to the applicable provisions in the Lease Option Agreement
when pursuing certain claims such as unpaid rent.4 After the appellate
court determined that the Lease Option Agreement provided for
attorney’s fees, the appellate court held the trial court was bound to award
the fees as the trial court only had discretionary powers to determine if
the fees were reasonable, not whether or not they should be applied. As
the parties contracted for attorney’s fees in their agreement, there was no
ambiguity to be resolved by the court. Therefore, the trial court did not
have the discretion to set aside attorney’s fees as included in the parties’
agreement.
However, as the appellate court was bound to enforce the terms of
the overarching contract, the court did not grant attorney’s fees solely for
the Meeks as the moving party as the court found it was possible that the
Kecks were also entitled to attorney’s fees. Therefore, the court reversed
the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees due to each
party under the contract. Finally, as neither party requested attorney’s fees
on appeal, the court declined to grant any fees to either party.5
This case demonstrates that the court is not in the business of
rewriting contracts, but they will resolve ambiguities in contracts. This case
3 Considering whether the liquidated damages clause at hand would serve primarily
as a penalty, the Court stated that the Court’s prior position and analysis in Harmon v.
Eggers was directly on point for this case. In Harmon, the court reviewed a similar
liquidated damages provision that was centered around a lease option payment plan
which called for any breach by nonpayment to result in a forfeiture of all prior payments.
The court in Harmon determined that the liquidated damages provision of the contract
was punitive and did not reflect a reasonable measure of damages.
4 The Court noted that Tennessee generally adheres to the “American Rule” for
recovery of attorney’s fees, citing Cracker Barrel. Cracker Barrel, 284 S.W.3d at 309
(attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in the absence of a statute or contract specifically
providing for such recovery …) (quoting Pullman Standard, Inc. v. Abex Corp., 693
S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 1985)).
5See Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Tenn. 2006) (“An
award of attorney's fees generated in pursuing the appeal is a form of relief; the rule
requires it to be stated.”) (citing Tenn. R. App. 27(a)).
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additionally provides insight for transactional attorneys on the importance
of clearly drafting contracts and ensuring the language is not ambiguous.
It also serves as a cautionary tale for parties to raise issues on appeal to
preserve the court’s resolution of the issue. It is important to note that the
parties in this case relied on verbal discussions rather than the written
contract that the transaction was based on. The Lease Option Contract
was spread across four contracts, written at different points of time, and
left out key pieces of information. The court was willing to enforce clauses
that were clear on their face, like the attorney’s fee clause, as the court
wants to allow parties to freely contract. However, the court is still
constrained by matters of public policy, and so it refused to enforce the
liquidated damages clause as it was not created to return a reasonable
estimation of damages in the case of a breach but was made to penalize
the Kecks in the case of nonpayment.

CONTRACTS—INTENT AND MERGER AGREEMENTS
Under Tennessee law, an agreement to a “merger proposal” is not
sufficient to demonstrate mutual assent to be bound by a contract
when some terms of the agreement remain unaddressed and the
parties’ subsequent actions do not objectively manifest an intention
to be bound by the agreement; however, the parties’ intent to reduce
the agreement to a memorandum of understanding is not itself
enough to render an otherwise valid contract unenforceable. Am. Bd.
of Craniofacial Pain v. Am. Bd. of Orofacial Pain, No. M201801696COAR3CV,
2020 WL 7213230 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2020).

Laws M. Bouldin
In American Board of Craniofacial Pain v. American Board of Orofacial Pain,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether a binding agreement
was formed between two professional associations that had been engaged
in merger discussions. The Plaintiff, American Board of Craniofacial Pain
(“ABCP”), sought specific performance of the contract which it claimed
was formed by the exchange of emails. The Defendant, American Board
of Orofacial Pain (“ABOP”), refuted the existence of a binding contract
by showing that the parties intended to execute a memorandum of
understanding.
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ABCP and ABOP are professional organizations which primarily
conduct examinations and issue certifications in the fields of Craniofacial
and Orofacial pain, respectively. In the spring of 2014, the organizations
entered into merger discussions in hopes that unification would increase
the chances of recognition by the American Board of Dental Specialties.
The organizations formed a joint merger committee which included
Dr. Clifton Simmons, the president of ABCP, and Dr. Dale Ehrlich, the
president of ABOP. In June, the committee met via teleconference and
discussed a draft memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) which had
been prepared by Dr. Simmons.
Following that meeting, the ABOP Board of Directors drafted its own
merger document. Dr. Ehrlich attached the two-page document to an
email sent to Dr. Simmons on July 14, 2014 with the subject line “Merger
Proposal.” The body of the email stated in relevant part, “we respectfully
submit the attachment which is a merger proposal for your discussion and
consideration prior to our [next] teleconference.” Id. at *1.
On July 23, 2014, Dr. Simmons sent an email to the joint merger
committee, indicating that ABCP had “voted to accept” the merger
proposal sent by Dr. Ehrlich. In the email, Dr. Simmons also stated: “I
suppose that a Memorandum of Understanding or other document needs
to be constructed to consummate this merger.” Dr. Ehrlich responded
with an indication that he would begin work on the MOU. Id.
In August, Dr. Ehrlich sent an email to the committee outlining the
remaining requirements to complete the merger including apparent
“roadblocks.” Dr. Ehrlich expressed concern that the merger would not
meet the set deadline and requested necessary information from ABCP
and Dr. Simmons. Soon after, at least part of the requested information
was sent to Dr. Ehrlich. Dr. Simmons also expressed his hope that the
MOU would soon be completed so that attorneys from each organization
could review the document.
Days after the email from Dr. Simmons, Dr. Ehrlich responded
indicating that ABOP no longer intended to pursue the merger. The email
cited the incompatibility of the two certification and exam processes as
part of the reason for the reversal. The email also stated the merger would
actually undermine ABOP’s own independent attempt to seek recognition
by the American Board of Dental Specialties.
ABCP sued, arguing that a binding contract resulted from its
acceptance of the July 14 merger proposal email. ABCP claimed that
ABOP had breached the merger contract by independently seeking
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recognition from the American Board of Dental Specialties and requested
specific performance of the merger.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgement. ABOP made
two arguments supporting its allegation that there was no binding
contract. First, it argued there was an express understanding that the
agreement was to be reduced in writing in the form of an MOU prepared
and reviewed by attorneys. Second, it claimed that even if a final MOU
was not necessary, there was never an agreement as to all material elements
of the merger so there could be no meeting of the minds. The chancery
court granted ABOP’s motion, finding that a binding contract could not
have been formed due to a lack of mutual assent.
On appeal, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. The appellate court
concluded that the parties had intended for the merger contract to be
binding only after an MOU was finalized based on (1) the extent to which
an express agreement had been reach on all terms to be included in the
final merger document, and (2) the parties’ conduct following the
purported merger agreement.
The appellate court began by discussing the objective test to determine
mutual assent as established by T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WRH
Enterprises, LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). A party can be
bound by a contract by objectively manifesting assent to its terms. So, in
determining whether there is mutual assent the court must look to the
parties’ behavior. However, their behavior is considered in light of the
surrounding circumstances, including the terms of the purported
agreement.
The appellate court then turned to whether the terms of the
agreement were sufficiently definite, which would support a finding that
there was mutual assent and therefore a binding contract. In making this
determination the court looked to EnGenius Entm’t, Inc. v. Herenton, 971
S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), which emphasizes that all essential
terms which are to be reduced to writing must be agreed to for a binding
contract to be formed.
Applying EnGenius, the appellate court found that the July 14th email
and subsequent communications between the parties failed to address
material terms necessary to form a binding contract. Specifically, the court
pointed out that there was no clear indication of which organization was
to be the surviving entity in the merger. Even assuming that such a
determination had been made, there would still remain the issue of how
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each organization’s assets would be distributed. The ABOP proposal
addressed one group of assets, but left others unaddressed.
The appellate court also addressed the parties’ conduct following the
July 14th email. First, it looked to Dr. Simmons’ email in which he stated
that ABCP had voted in favor of the merger proposal, but went on to say,
“a memorandum of understanding or other document need[ed] to be
constructed to consummate this merger.” Id. at *1. This coupled with Dr.
Ehrlich’s subsequent email discussing “roadblocks” to the merger and
describing the memorandum of understanding as “essential” to the
merger, were sufficient to demonstrate ABCP knew that the MOU was
necessary to form a binding agreement.
The appellate court concluded that no enforceable contract was
formed between ABOP and ABCP and therefore specific performance
was not a remedy available to ABCP. The court reached its conclusion by
applying the objective test for mutual assent. A significant part of the
appellate court’s analysis relied on the finding that there were material
elements of the agreement which had not been addressed at the time the
purported contract was formed.
The appellate court’s conclusion seems to align with its previous
decisions. However, it does little to clarify its view of “mutual assent.” The
appellate court does make clear that the parties’ objective manifestations
of assent are inextricably intertwined with the definitiveness of agreedupon terms. Thus, the somewhat convoluted use of these factors in
determining mutual assent may reflect an understandable reluctance of the
court to find an enforceable contract for the merger without a complete
and comprehensive written contract.
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FEDERAL INCOME TAX—STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ON ASSESSMENTS
The United States Tax Court held that the statute of limitations
period for assessments was triggered when a taxpayer submitted an
income tax return although the submission was rejected by the
Internal Revenue Service’s e-filing system. Fowler v. Comm’r, No. 1281018, 2020 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 24 (T.C. Sept. 9, 2020).

Shane Carey
The United States Tax Court considered which of a taxpayer’s tax
return submissions triggered the running of the three-year limitations
period under I.R.C. § 6501(a). The taxpayer filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the notice of deficiency from the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) was outside of the limitations period for
assessments, and thus not timely issued. The IRS took the position that
the taxpayer’s initial tax return submission was not valid because it did not
contain an Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (“IP
PIN”). Therefore, the IRS argued the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the taxpayer updated the return to include the IP PIN.
However, the court disagreed and ultimately granted the taxpayer’s motion
for summary judgment.
On or before April 15, 2014, Robin J. Fowler (“Petitioner”) filed Form
4868, Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return. The Extension was timely filed, thus extending the
due date of Petitioner’s 2013 Form 1040 to October 15, 2014. Petitioner
engaged Bennett Thrasher, LLP (“Bennett Thrasher”), a public
accounting firm, to file the completed 2013 Form 1040. Petitioner esigned Form 8879, IRS e-file Signature Authorization, which authorized
Bennett Thrasher to file the return on Petitioner’s behalf as an electronic
return originator (“ERO”). On October 15, 2014 (“October 15
submission”), a partner at Bennett Thrasher e-signed Petitioner’s 2013
Form 1040 with a Practitioner Personal Identification Number
(“Practitioner PIN”) and transmitted the return to the IRS. After
transmitting the return, Bennett Thrasher received a Submission ID for
the transmitted return. On the same day, the IRS’s software received the
transmitted return but subsequently sent Bennett Thrasher a rejection
notice. The rejection notice cited code “IND-181,” which corresponds to
a failure to provide a valid IP PIN with the return.
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Petitioner submitted another 2013 Form 1040 on October 28, 2014
(“October 28 submission”). With this submission, Bennett Thrasher
prepared a paper copy of 2013 Form 1040 with the same information used
on the October 15 submission. Bennett Thrasher mailed the October 28
submission to the IRS Service Center in Austin, Texas, via U.S. Postal
Service Certified Mail with Return Receipt. The return was delivered to
the IRS on October 30, 2014, as confirmed by the return receipt. In
December 2014, Petitioner received a letter from the IRS notifying him
that the IRS had not yet received his 2013 Form 1040.
Prior to April 30, 2015, Bennett Thrasher obtained Petitioner’s IP PIN
from the IRS. Bennett Thrasher then used this IP PIN on a new version
of the 2013 Form 1040 and e-filed the return with the IRS on April 30,
2015. Other than the inclusion of Petitioner’s IP PIN, the tax information
on the third submission was identical to the information submitted to the
IRS on the first two submissions. The IRS’s software reviewed and
accepted this third submission on April 30, 2015. The IRS issued a notice
of deficiency for the 2013 tax year to Petitioner on April 5, 2018.
Following receipt of the notice, Petitioner filed a petition in the United
States Tax Court challenging the notice of deficiency on the grounds that
the statute of limitations for tax assessments had lapsed.
Internal Revenue Code Section 6501(a) imposes a three-year
limitations period for tax assessments. The third submission of the 2013
Form 1040 by Petitioner on April 30, 2015 fell within the three-year period
prior to the issuance of the notice of deficiency from the IRS on April 5,
2018. Accordingly, if only the third submission satisfied the requirements
for a valid tax return filing, then the notice of deficiency from the IRS
would be considered timely issued. Therefore, the United States Tax Court
considered whether either of the first two submissions triggered the
running of the three-year limitations period under I.R.C. § 6501(a).
Generally, I.R.C. § 6501(a) requires that the IRS assess tax within three
years after the taxpayer files a tax return. If the return is timely filed, the
three-year period begins on the due date of the return. However, if the
return is filed late, the three-year period begins on the actual filing date.
The Supreme Court of the United States previously stated that this threeyear limitation period is “an almost indispensable element of fairness as
well as of practical administration of an income tax policy.” Rothensies v.
Elec. Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946). Moreover, it gives
taxpayers who file honest returns assurance that their tax liabilities will not
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be reopened after that period. Mabel Elevator Co. v. Comm’r, 2 B.T.A 517,
519 (1925).
More specifically, the limitations period imposed by I.R.C. § 6501(a)
begins when a return is filed if (1) the document that the taxpayer
submitted was a required return and (2) the taxpayer properly filed the
return. Appleton v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 273, 284 (2013). Therefore, the Tax
Court first considered what constitutes a required return. I.R.C. § 6501(a)
states that “the term ‘return’ means the return required to be filed by the
taxpayer.” Neither this statute, nor the regulations thereunder, give more
detail beyond this description as to the meaning. Thus, the Tax Court
generally relies on the test established in Beard v. Commissioner to determine
whether a document is considered to be a return. 82 T.C. 766, 777 (1984),
aff ’d, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986). First, the Beard test requires that the
document purport to be a return and provide sufficient data to calculate a
tax liability. Id. It also requires that the taxpayer make an “honest and
reasonable” attempt to satisfy the requirements of tax law. Id. Lastly, under
Beard, the taxpayer must execute the document under penalties of perjury.
Id.
As to the first element, the IRS prefers submissions be made on the
forms that the IRS has prescribed. Hulett v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. 60, 89 (2018).
As such, the Tax Court found that the October 15 submission purported
to be a return since Petitioner filed a 2013 Form 1040. Additionally, neither
Petitioner nor the IRS disputed that the October 15 submission reported
gross income, deductions, and credits, thereby resulting in taxable income.
Next, the Tax Court considered whether Petitioner made an “honest
and reasonable” attempt to satisfy the requirements of tax law. Hulett
distinguished a tax protester zero return, in which individuals may file a
document containing only zeros on the relevant lines, from a return that
shows an attempt to accurately report both income and deductions. Id. at
90. Interestingly enough, this means that even a fraudulent return may
satisfy this requirement so long as the return appears genuine on its face.
Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1984). Here, Petitioner’s
submission included information regarding his income, deductions,
exemptions, and credits. The only difference between the rejected October
15 submission and the April 30 submission, which the IRS accepted, was
that the October 15 submission did not include the IP PIN. The omission
of the IP PIN alone is not enough to categorize this as a protester return.
The Tax Court also criticized the IRS for automatically rejecting e-filed
returns that do not contain an IP PIN yet failing to automatically reject
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paper filed returns for the same reason. Therefore, the Tax Court found
that Petitioner’s October 15 submission was sufficient to satisfy the second
element under Beard.
The final Beard requirement states that the taxpayer must execute the
document under penalties of perjury. This was the primary dispute
between Petitioner and the IRS. In I.R.C. § 6061(a), Congress granted the
Secretary authority to prescribe forms or regulations defining the signature
method for any return. It also granted the authority to develop procedures
for the acceptance of signatures in digital or other electronic form. The
IRS argued that Petitioner’s October 15 submission failed to satisfy the
signature requirement since it did not contain an IP PIN. However, the IP
PIN is separate from the signature guidance previously issued by the
Secretary. Besides I.R.C. § 6061, there is not much guidance on what
constitutes a valid signature. Section 1.6695-1(b)(2) instructs a signing tax
return preparer to sign the return electronically in the manner that is
prescribed by the Commissioner in forms, instructions, or other
appropriate guidance. Accordingly, the instructions to the 2013 Form 1040
state that the taxpayer must sign the return electronically using a PIN,
which can be either a Self-Select PIN or a Practitioner PIN.
Bennett Thrasher signed the return using a Practitioner PIN in
accordance with the instructions. Although the IRS then argued that the
IP PIN was part of the signature requirement, the Tax Court found no
IRS guidance characterizing an IP PIN as a signature. The Tax Court went
on to state that the IRS could not ignore its own instructions to
accommodate a particular litigation stance. The IRS cited the Internal
Revenue Manual, which provides that if a return is electronically filed with
an incorrect or omitted IP PIN, the software will reject the return.
However, an IP PIN does not become part of the signature requirement
simply because the IRS’s software will reject a return without it. In fact,
there are numerous occasions in which the IRS’s software may reject a
return that still meets the Beard requirements. Consequently, the Tax Court
held that an IP PIN is not required to start the limitations period under
I.R.C. § 6501(a). Therefore, the October 15 submission fully satisfies the
Beard test and constitutes a “return” for statute of limitations purposes.
As previously mentioned, a “return” alone does not trigger the statute
of limitations on assessments. Rather, the return must also be properly
filed. A question of proper filing consists of determining whether the
taxpayer’s mode of filing complied with the prescribed filing requirements.
In general, a return is “filed” when it has been physically delivered to the
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correct IRS office. The Tax Court held in Blount v. Commissioner that a
document which qualifies as a return under Beard is considered filed upon
delivery regardless of whether the IRS accepts or processes the document.
86 T.C. 383, 387–88 (1986).
There was no genuine dispute that the October 15 submission was
delivered to the IRS. Petitioner was able to provide a transmission log from
Bennett Thrasher which contained the 20-digit Submission ID given to an
ERO after submitting a return. The IRS further acknowledged the
submission when its counsel stated that Petitioner first attempted to e-file
his 2013 income tax return on October 15, 2014, but the attempt was
unsuccessful due to the missing IP PIN. The IRS did not raise an objection
to how Petitioner delivered the October 15 submission, but instead only
had an issue with the content of the return. Accordingly, the Tax Court
found that the return was delivered to the IRS and that Petitioner properly
filed the return.
Because the taxpayer’s October 15 submission was considered a
required return and was properly filed, the statute of limitations period
was triggered on October 15, 2014. As previously stated, I.R.C. § 6501(a)
requires that the IRS assess a tax within three years after the taxpayer files
a return. Therefore, the statute of limitations on assessments under I.R.C.
§ 6501(a) lapsed in October 2017. The IRS did not issue the notice of
deficiency until April 5, 2018. As such, the Tax Court concluded that the
limitations period expired before the IRS issued the notice of deficiency
and ultimately granted Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.
Tax practitioners should be cognizant of the precedent set by the
United States Tax Court. It is commonplace to have tax return
submissions rejected by the IRS’s e-filing system for a multitude of
reasons. Most notably, returns can be rejected for issues such as a social
security number for a dependent child matching another return already
accepted by the IRS or certain schema errors with the IRS’s e-file system.
Even though these returns are rejected by the e-file system, they may still
be valid returns under the Beard analysis. Therefore, the statute of
limitations period for assessments may well be triggered even if the IRS
has not formally accepted the return. For the 2020 tax year, and likely
based on the unfavorable outcome the IRS received in Fowler, the IRS has
updated the requirements for an electronic return to clarify that if an IP
PIN has been issued to a taxpayer, it must be included on the submission
for the signature to be considered valid. However, the instructions for tax
years prior to 2020 only require that the return be signed using a Self-Select
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PIN or Practitioner PIN. If a taxpayer’s return was previously rejected by
the IRS’s e-file system for any reason, tax practitioners should be diligent
in determining the date in which the statute of limitations was actually
triggered and respond accordingly if a notice of deficiency is issued.

REAL ESTATE—UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND
ENFORCEABILITY OF DEEDS OF TRUST
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a deed of trust was
unenforceable and not eligible for reformation after determining the
plaintiff made a unilateral mistake when it altered the deed after
execution and subsequently recorded the document. Tennessee State
Bank v. Mashek, No. E2019-00591-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 2569835, 2020
Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2020).

Hannah-Claire Boggess
In Tennessee State Bank v. Mashek, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
considered whether alterations to an executed deed of trust (the “deed”)
made prior to recording were mistakes that barred reformation and
rendered the deed unenforceable.1 The Court concluded that because
Tennessee State Bank (the “Bank”) acted with gross negligence in altering
the date of the document and failed to demonstrate mutual mistake or
fraud as required, the Bank committed “a material, unilateral mistake”
which barred the deed from being reformed and rendered it
unenforceable. Id. at *21, *24.
In late 2003, the defendant, Mr. Mashek, sought and obtained a home
equity line of credit (“HELOC”) via a promissory note (the “Note”) from
the Bank. The Note was secured by a deed of trust attached to Mr.
Mashek’s property in Powell, Tennessee. In order to secure the HELOC,
Mr. Mashek executed the Note, the deed, a notice of right of recission,
and a sweep authorization form. Mr. Mashek’s wife, Mrs. Mashek, also
executed the deed but was not obligated to the debt. All of the documents
were fully executed by December 22, 2003 in Minnesota.

The Court cited to Sikora v. Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) as
binding precedent requiring plaintiffs seeking reformation to establish that the material
differences between the agreements were not the result of gross negligence by the
plaintiffs and that there was a mutual mistake or fraud by the defendant.
1
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When the balance on the HELOC was at or close to zero, Mr. Mashek
contacted the Bank in order to close the line of credit. When Mr. Mashek
was informed that there would be a fee for the service under the terms of
the note, he decided to leave the line open and made additional draws from
the HELOC. Mr. Mashek was contacted in 2011 by the Bank following an
apparent failure to make the required payments. After his request for the
original loan documents was refused by the Bank, Mr. Mashek stopped
making any additional payments. In response, the Bank commenced
foreclosure proceedings in 2012 on the property, which prompted Mr.
Mashek to inform the Bank that the documents he signed in December
2003 were altered. Mr. Mashek opposed the foreclosure of his property
based on the alterations to the loan documents.
After discovering the alterations in the loan documents, the Bank filed
a complaint in the Chancery Court for Knox County on March 8, 2012.
The complaint named as defendants Mr. and Mrs. Mashek (the
“Masheks”) and the title company hired to prepare the HELOC
documents. The Bank asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment that
the recorded deed was valid and enforceable, thereby allowing the Bank to
continue with foreclosure proceedings. Alternatively, the Bank requested
that the court reform the recorded deed. The Bank also sought to obtain
a monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek for the amount owed on the
HELOC, plus interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses. The
Masheks responded to the Bank’s complaint by filing a motion to dismiss,
asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 The trial
court denied the Masheks’ motion.
The Bank filed a motion for default judgment against Mr. Mashek in
January 2013. Mr. Mashek responded with a counterclaim against the
Bank, asserting that the recorded deed of trust was unenforceable because
of the Bank’s alterations. Mr. Mashek further alleged the Bank engaged in
criminal forgery. Mr. Mashek attached to his counterclaim “a copy of the
deed of trust he claimed to have executed and then sent a copy of by
Abstract Title, the first page of which had been ‘Exhibit C’ to the Bank’s
complaint.” Id. at *4. The deed executed by the Masheks contained four
errors: (1) the deed secured the obligation of Breaking Bread Inc., an entity
not known to either party, instead of the Masheks; (2) the deed’s notary
Attached to the motion was an affidavit from a forensic document expert which
stated that the face page of the recorded deed of trust had been replaced and that the
purported initials of Mr. and Mrs. Mashek on one of the documents was not made by
their hand.
2
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acknowledgment stated the document was executed in Knox County,
Tennessee, when it was executed and notarized in Minnesota; (3) the date
on the notice of right of recission was changed to seven days earlier; and
(4) the “Open Ended Mortgage” box was checked on the executed deed
but not on the recorded deed. Mr. Mashek denied that he owed money to
the Bank based on his argument that the recorded deed of trust was
unenforceable due to the changes between the instruments. In response,
the Bank agreed there were differences between the recorded deed and
executed deed but argued that any changes were made by the title
company.
The Bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment on June 5, 2017
requesting that Mr. Mashek’s counterclaims be dismissed, a judgment of
the amount owned on the line of credit plus interest be entered against
Mr. Mashek, and the trial court reform the deed of trust.3
On July 13, 2017, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to
the Bank.4 The trial court held that the executed deed of trust would be
reformed and enforceable, allowing the Bank to continue foreclosure
proceedings. The Bank subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend
requesting the trial court address the Bank’s claim for a monetary
judgment against Mr. Mashek and “seeking to have the court enter an
order specifically reforming the Executed Deed of Trust to conform to
the Recorded Deed of Trust.” Id. at *6. The Bank further requested that
the trial court specifically state that the changes to the documents were
not fraudulent. The trial court granted the Bank’s request for a monetary
judgment against Mr. Mashek in the amount of the loan, plus interest, and
directed the executed deed be reformed to conform with the recorded

The Bank attached an expert opinion to its motion which stated that the mistakes
between the agreements were scrivener’s errors which could be corrected to reflect the
intent of the parties. The Bank also attached an affidavit of Ms. Spurgeon, a bank
employee, which provided the outstanding balance, plus interest, of Mr. Mashek’s loan.
The Masheks filed a motion in opposition.
4 The trial court determined that the changes made to the executed deed of trust as
reflected in the recorded deed were scrivener’s errors and that the Masheks had benefitted
from their agreement with the Bank. Although the trial court found that the methods
used to correct the mistakes in the documents were “deplorable,” the court ultimately
concluded that the methods were not taken in bad faith and that the changes were neither
material nor to the disadvantage of the Masheks.
3
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deed and changed the recorded deed to check the open-end mortgage
box.5
The Masheks’ appeal presented issues regarding the trial court’s grant
of partial summary judgment in favor of the Bank, the grant for
reformation, the award of the loan amount and interest, the grant of
attorney’s fees, the failure to dismiss the Bank’s complaint, and the
dismissal of their own counterclaims.6 The Bank raised additional issues
regarding the trial court’s denial of the Bank’s request to state the changes
to the loan documents were not fraudulent and whether the trial court
should have awarded the Bank’s entire requested amount of attorney’s
fees.
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s grant of partial
summary judgment and conclusions of law de novo with no presumption
of correctness. The court of appeals reviewed the decision regarding
attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.
The court of appeals focused on the trial court’s grant of partial
summary judgment based on its “finding that the Bank was entitled to
reform the Executed Deed of Trust to conform to the Recorded Deed of
Trust with the addition of the check mark indicating an open-ended
mortgage.” Id. at *12. Courts have the power to reform the terms of
written agreements when the error is based on a mistake in expression
“where one or both parties to a written contract erroneously believes that
the contract embodies the agreement that both parties intended it to
express.” Id. (quoting Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287). But for a court to grant
reformation based on a mistake in expression, the party seeking
reformation must show by clear and convincing evidence that: “(1) the
parties reached a prior agreement regarding some aspect of the bargain;
(2) they intended the prior agreement to be included in the written
contract; (3) the written contract materially differs from the prior
agreement; and (4) the variation between the prior agreement and the
written contract is not the result of gross negligence on the part of the
party seeking reformation.” Id. (quoting Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 287–88).
The trial court concluded that the first two alterations, the naming of
Breaking Bread Inc. instead of the Masheks in the deed and the notary
acknowledgment in Knox County, Tennessee instead of Minnesota,
The trial court also granted attorney’s fees to the Bank in an amount that would
ordinarily be expected in a foreclosure action. The trial court did not specifically state
that the changes to the document were not fraudulent.
6 The court of appeals noted that the Masheks were proceeding pro se. Id. at *9.
5
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constituted mistakes that did not evidence the intended bargain of the
parties. The Masheks argued that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-107 was a total
barrier to enforcement of the executed deed, but the court of appeals
concluded the purpose of the statute was to allow for correction that
reflects the intent of the parties. The court of appeals further agreed with
the trial court that the first two changes were corrections to mistakes in
expression, shared by both parties, that could be reformed under Sikora.
With respect to the difference between the executed deed and the
recorded deed involving the changed date of acknowledgement, the trial
court could not determine the reason for the change but found it to be a
unilateral alteration by the Bank. The notice was signed by the Masheks
on December 22, 2003, but the date was later changed to December 15,
2003. The trial court granted reformation of the executed deed to
December 22, 2003, and the court of appeals agreed that the change by
the Bank affected neither the parties’ agreement nor the validity of the
deed. However, the court of appeals recognized “that the Masheks’ central
issue with regard to the Recission Notice is not the alteration of the date
by their signatures but the manner in which the change was made” by the
use of the Masheks’ initials in another’s hand. Id. at *21. The Masheks
argued that the change amounted to forgery, which estopped the Bank
from enforcing the agreement. Although a forged signature invalidates a
deed, there must also be intent to defraud. Because the court of appeals
could not find any evidence of the Bank’s intent that rose to the level of
criminal forgery, the entire agreement was not invalidated. Turning to the
Sikora analysis the court of appeals concluded:
We determine that the manner in which the change was made
exhibited gross negligence on the part of the Bank or its agent(s) in that
the act of affixing the Masheks’ initials over the altered date without
authorization or notice constituted a failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. Id. at *22 (citing
Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 290). Therefore, although the deed was not affected
by the change and the act was not forgery which invalidated the entire
agreement, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting
the Bank’s request for reformation of the recission notice because the
alteration was the result of gross negligence.
In considering the failure to check the “Open Ended Mortgage” box
on the recorded deed, the trial court ordered that both the executed deed
and the recorded deed be reformed because “the effect of the October
2017 order would be that an entirely new document would be recorded.”
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Id. The court of appeals first noted that the trial court erred in its
conclusion that the failure to check the box was a mistake because the
alteration did not evidence the parties’ original agreement. The trial court
concluded the treatment of the error as a mistake “ultimately proved
erroneous in the trial court’s analysis.” Id. at *13. However, the court of
appeals found a “fatal flaw” in the trial court’s ruling granting reformation
because the difference was not known to Mr. Mashek at the time the
change was made. Id. at *22. Because the error “was not the result of
mutual mistake in expression,” it was a unilateral mistake by the Bank. Id.
at *23. The court of appeals further determined that the mistake was
material because there are specific and unique rights available to holders
of open-end mortgages.7 The court of appeals concluded that the Bank
made a material, unilateral mistake unknown to the Masheks when it failed
to check the open-end mortgage box on the recorded deed. Therefore,
“the Bank could not prove the essential reformation element of mutual
mistake or fraud at the time of the agreement’s execution.” Id. at *24
(citing Sikora, 212 S.W.3d at 288). The court of appeals reversed the trial
court’s grant of partial summary judgment and declared the executed deed
and the recorded deed unenforceable.
In explaining that the unenforceability of the deeds did not affect the
enforceability of the note, the court of appeals summarized the
relationship between the executed deed and the note as “a deed of trust is
an instrument which secures with real property the payment of a debt,
typically evidenced by a promissory note . . . Promissory notes secured by
deeds of trusts are generally considered negotiable instruments.” Id. at
*11. Because the alterations were to the executed deed and the recission
notice, but not to the note itself, “the Note would remain a negotiable
instrument, albeit an unsecured one, representing the agreement entered
into by the parties for the repayment of the principal.” Id. at *12. The
court of appeals therefore affirmed the trial court’s granting of partial
summary judgment by awarding the Bank the outstanding amount of the
HELOC plus interest under the terms of the note.
The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s granting of the Bank’s
request for attorney’s fees and expenses “incurred in attempting to enforce
the Executed Deed of trust and the Recorded Deed of Trust.” Because
“A conspicuous notice concerning an open-end mortgage and the borrower’s right,
as displayed on the Executed Deed of Trust, is required to be on an open-end mortgage
document pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-28-104(a) (2013).” Id. at *24.
7
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the court of appeals determined the deeds were unenforceable, the proper
award of attorney’s fees should have been awarded solely under the
provisions regarding attorney’s fees in the note. The court of appeals
further found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding regarding
the Bank’s alterations to the loan documents but clarified that there was
no finding of intent rising to the level of criminal forgery.
Any transactional attorney who prefers to not have his or her name or
his or her client’s name associated with an opinion that notes actions taken
were “procedurally questionable and even perhaps fraudulent” and further
“shock[ed] the conscience of the Court” should take great care in drafting,
reviewing, and making changes to legal documents. Id. at *18, *22.
Although it is conceivable that the Bank or title company considered the
changes made to the loan documents to be scrivener’s errors, due diligence
demanded, at minimum, notice to the Masheks of the changes. Assuming,
arguendo, that the changes to the documents were made by the title
company and not the Bank, the Bank or its agents should still have
reviewed the documents before and after execution. Following Mashek,
transactional attorneys should exercise caution in passing legal documents
on to third parties and allowing such documents to be recorded; Tennessee
courts may have turned the page on a broad view of fixable mistakes in
expression.

REAL ESTATE—DUE DILIGENCE AND REFORMATION
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a quitclaim deed issued by
single spouse could not be equitably reformed to include the wife
despite a mistake when doing so would have deprived an innocent
third party of properly recorded interests. Trent v. Mt. Commerce Bank,
606 S.W.3d 258 (Tenn. 2020).

Walker Lewis
In Trent v. Mt. Commerce Bank, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the lower courts, but came to the decision on different,
clearer grounds in determining whether a quitclaim deed should be
equitably reformed when reformation would benefit parties with
constructive notice of a title defect and harm the rights of creditors with
recorded judgment liens.
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In 2010, Adren and Pamela Greene (the “Greenes”) defaulted on real
estate development loans from Mountain Commerce Bank. Because of
the looming possibility of foreclosure and deficiency actions, the couple
sought to transfer property that they owned to limited partnerships in
which they had an interest. An attorney prepared six quitclaim deeds that
transferred ten parcels of property to these limited partnerships. The
Greenes did not review the quitclaim deeds, but signed them on March 10,
2010.
One of the properties that was transferred to the limited partnerships
was a piece of property in Morristown that the couple owned as tenants
by the entirety.1 However, when the attorney had prepared the quitclaim
deed for this property, he omitted Mrs. Greene as a grantor, and as such,
she did not sign the deed. This quitclaim deed, signed only by Mr. Greene,
was subsequently recorded on March 18, 2010.
Subsequently, both Mountain Commerce Bank and People’s
Community Bank foreclosed on development property that the Greenes
owned and sued to collect deficiency balances. In January of 2012, a
judgment was entered against the Greenes in favor of Mountain
Commerce Bank. The judgment was recorded in October 2013. In August
2012, a judgment was entered against the Greenes in favor of People’s
Community Bank. The judgment was recorded in March 2013.
In 2016, Scott and Ted Trent (the “Trents”) purchased the Morristown
property from the Greenes’ limited partnership with financing from Civis
Bank. In 2017, the Trents and Civis Bank learned that Mrs. Greene still
had an interest in the Morristown property.2 On March 22, 2017, both of
the Greenes signed a “corrected” quitclaim deed which explained the
original erroneous omission. Id. at 261. This updated deed was recorded
one week later on March 29, 2017.
The Trents then petitioned the Chancery Court for a declaratory
judgment establishing that the corrected 2017 quitclaim deed reformed
the original 2010 quitclaim deed due to mutual mistake of the parties. The
Trents’ petition sought to have the quitclaim deed reformed to vest Real
Tenancy by the entirety is available only to married couples. This concept maintains
that married couples are not individual people, but one entity, or person.
2 Because it was a tenancy by the entirety, Mr. Greene was unable to unilaterally
transfer the entire interest in the property. Instead, Mrs. Greene still retained her
survivorship interest. See Bryant v. Bryant, 522 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. 2017); Robinson
v. Trousdale Cnty., 516 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1974) (“[a]ny unilateral attempt [to transfer
the entire property] will be wholly . . . void at the instance of the [other spouse] and any
prospective purchaser, transferee, lessee, mortgagee and the like will act at his peril”).
1
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Estate Holdings—the Greene’s limited partnership—with full ownership
of the Property as of March 10, 2010, and free from the Banks' recorded
judgment liens.3 However, the trial court declined to reform the original
deed, as it reasoned that there was no mutual mistake since Mrs. Greene
was not even a party to the original quitclaim deed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, but on different grounds.
Tennessee is rife4 with case law addressing the equitable remedy of
contract reformation. Generally, Tennessee courts have the ability to
reform written instruments to accurately reflect the parties’ agreement. It
is an equitable remedy “by which courts may correct a mistake in a writing
so that it fully and accurately reflects the agreement of the parties.” Id. at
263 (citing Lane v. Spriggs, 71 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). To
remedy a mistake, the mistake must be mutual, meaning a mistake
common to all of the parties to the written contract. The party seeking
reformation must make a showing of clear and convincing evidence that:
the parties reached a prior agreement regarding some aspect of
the bargain;
they intended the prior agreement to be included in the written
contract;
the written contract materially differs from the prior agreement;
and
the variation between the prior agreement and the written
contract is not the result of gross negligence on the part of the
party seeking reformation.

Id. at 263 (citing Sikora v. Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 277, 287–88). The
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the lower court’s reasoning regarding
this analysis put the metaphorical cart before the horse. Specifically, the
court stated that it need not even concern itself with whether a missing
grantor may be added to a deed through reformation, because even if

There was no issue of material fact in this case. The order of priority for
lienholders is purely a question of law. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-101(b)(1)
(2017) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-26-101(2015), the Trents were low on the priority
ladder, falling behind Mrs. Greene’s interest and the recorded interests of both
Mountain Commerce Bank and People’s Community Bank.
4 See, e.g., Battle v. Claiborne, 180 S.W. 584, 587 (Tenn. 1915); Sikora v.
Vanderploeg, 212 S.W.3d 277, 287 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Greer v. J.T. Fargason
Grocer Co, 77 S.W.2d 443, 443–44 (Tenn. 1935); Tenn. Valley Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Patterson, 14 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tenn. 1929).
3
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reformation was available as a remedy, it does not take into account the
equities of the parties.
The court reasoned that since reformation is an equitable remedy, the
equities of all parties must be considered. The court found that it should
not reform a contract when the rights of innocent third parties would be
adversely and unfairly affected. As the court noted, this “almost universal
rule of equity” prevents the remedy of reformation when parties who
acquired interests in the property between the time of the execution of
the original instrument and the execution of the reforming instrument
would have their rights adversely affected.5 Id. at 264.
As the court had previously established, both Mountain Commercial
Bank and People’s Community Bank had acquired judgment liens and
recorded those liens between the time of the first quitclaim deed and the
corrected quitclaim deed. Both banks protected their interests and priority
through such recording at the county’s Register of Deeds office. The
Tennessee Supreme Court further justified this rationale through a survey
of case law from other states coming to the same conclusion. Id. at 264–
65.
The court additionally dismissed Trents’ argument invoking the case
Holiday Hospitality, finding that it involved a deed of trust that had been
mistakenly released, and thus dealt with a standard of canceling that deed
of trust rather than the reformation of a deed at issue in the Trent case. Id.
at 265 (citing Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. States Res., Inc., 232 S.W.3d
41, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).
Finally, the court curtly noted the Trents’ own failure to conduct due
diligence. The court emphasized that while both banks recorded their
interests, the Trents did not, and bought the property with constructive
notice of a defect in title. Thus, this constructive notice did not give them
protection as bona fide purchasers for value. In Tennessee, pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-26-102, any recorded instrument serves as notice
to other parties. Here, both banks had recorded their interests several years
before the Trents purchased the property. Thus, the court held that equity
does not allow the court to correct a mistake—which would be detrimental
to both banks—when the Trents could have avoided the issue with a
simple records search.

The court noted lienholders, bona fide purchasers, and others without notice who
acquired intervening or vested rights.
5
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This decision highlights the importance of due diligence. The issue
and related legal expenses included in this case could have—and should
have—been avoided by a simple records search.

REMEDIES—CONTRACT LICENSING AND
STATUTE INTERPRETATION
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b) did
not create a new, separate cause of action for an unlicensed
subcontractor’s suit against a contractor. The language of the
statute is clear: the General Assembly only meant to limit the
unlicensed subcontractor’s remedy to damages that can be shown
by clear and convincing proof. Sifuentes v. D.E.C., LLC, No. M201802183-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 4760329 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2020).

Samuel Rule
In Sifuentes v. D.E.C., LLC, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed
whether T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b) abrogates the common law remedy available
to an unlicensed subcontractor in a dispute with another professional. The
unlicensed subcontractor argued that his claims are not precluded because
the General Assembly had no intention of abolishing an unlicensed
contractor’s remedy at common law. However, the general contractor
argued that the statute eliminates common law claims, and that the claims
at bar should be dismissed because the plaintiff did not strictly comply
with the statutory remedy. Upon review, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court improperly granted summary judgement in favor of the
defendants.
In 2011, D.E.C., LLC (“D.E.C”) was hired by a commercial tenant to
construct a bowling alley. D.E.C. subcontracted with Mr. Sifuentes, owner
and operator of a sole proprietorship known as Jose’s Electric. Mr.
Sifuentes was hired “to install electrical wiring and lighting and bowling
alley equipment and/or machinery” for a specified hourly rate. Sifuentes,
2020 WL 4760329, at *1. After Mr. Sifuentes and his employees began
working, D.E.C. informed him that the deadline for completion was
October 31, 2011. Mr. Sifuentes explained that he needed to hire
additional employees and needed a higher hourly rate to complete the job
in time. D.E.C. ultimately agreed and Mr. Sifuentes hired additional
employees.
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D.E.C. ceased paying Mr. Sifuentes’ weekly invoices on September 7,
2011. Mr. Sifuentes asked D.E.C. about the outstanding invoices and was
told that “he needed to complete the work in order for D.E.C. to receive
payment from the general contractor.” Id. National Resources Company
(“NRC”) was the general contractor. Mr. Sifuentes already had an existing
contract with NRC for work elsewhere in the same building. Mr. Sifuentes
informed NRC that he could not continue working on the bowling alley
because D.E.C. ceased payments. NRC gave Mr. Sifuentes $33,000 to
continue working and warned him that if his work on the bowling alley
ceased, NRC would end their relationship. The $33,000 was not enough
to continue paying Mr. Sifuentes’ employees, so Mr. Sifuentes liquidated
his retirement and savings accounts to complete the project. Mr. Sifuentes
completed the bowling alley project by the stated deadline but was never
paid by D.E.C. for any work performed after August 27, 2011. Mr.
Sifuentes’ unpaid invoices totaled $134,002.88.
Mr. Sifuentes brought claims of breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, promissory fraud, and quantum meruit, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages. D.E.C. moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), claiming that Mr. Sifuentes or Jose’s Electric was
an unlicensed contractor and could not recover under common law claims
pursuant to T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b). The statute provides:
Any contractor required to be licensed under this part who is in
violation of this part or the rules and regulations promulgated by the
board shall not be permitted to recover any damages in any court other
than actual documented expenses that can be shown by clear and
convincing proof. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-6-103(b).
The trial court found that Mr. Sifuentes was an unlicensed contractor
within the meaning of the statute, even though he was assured by D.E.C.
that it would not be a problem because he would be “operating under a
licensed contractor” and to not “worry about securing a permit.” Sifuentes,
2020 WL 4760329, at *2. As such, the trial court held that the only available
cause of action was a statutory one. The trial court reasoned that the
statute “eliminated all other causes of action with respect to claims by an
unlicensed contractor” and dismissed Mr. Sifuentes’ claims with prejudice.
Id.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals disagreed in pertinent
part and reversed the trial court’s decision. Although the matter came
before the court as a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, the Court’s standard
of review was not under the typical Rule 12.02(6) standard of appellate
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review. Rule 12.02(6) states that “if. . . matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgement.” Id. (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02)). In making
its determination, the trial court did not confine its review to the pleadings.
Instead, the trial court looked at the entire record using extrinsic evidence,
so the motion was treated as a motion for summary judgement. Thus, the
appellate court’s standard of review in this case was de novo and the trial
court’s decision was not presumed to be correct.
To determine whether Mr. Sifuentes’ claims are allowed, the court had
to interpret the statute at issue, T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b). The goal of statutory
interpretation is to understand the General Assembly’s intent. When the
intent is unclear, the court looks to the plain language of the statute. Using
the basic rules of statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the
statute does not abrogate the common law remedy available to an
unlicensed contractor in a dispute with another professional. The statute
states that an unlicensed contractor “shall not be permitted to recover
damages in any court other than actual documented expenses that can be
shown by clear and convincing proof.” Id. at *4. Relying on the plain
meaning of the statute, the court ruled that the statute does not create a
new, separate cause of action. The legislature only intended to limit the
remedy available for contractors who failed to obtain a license. The Court
said that “the statute is consistent with the measure of damages allowed
at common law.” Id. at *4. The trial judge read a separate cause of action
into the statute, and then improperly granted summary judgement for the
defendants when the plaintiff did not strictly comply with the statutory
requirements of this new, separate cause of action.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no separate, statutory cause
of action. However, Mr. Sifuentes’ recovery is still limited by the statute,
because he was unlicensed. As such, Mr. Sifuentes could only recover
“actual documented expenses established by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
his breach of contract, promissory estoppel, promissory fraud,
consequential, and punitive damage claims, because Mr. Sifuentes could
not show “actual documented” damages. Id. However, the court reversed
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the quantum meruit claim because the
submitted invoices are actual documented damages that comply with
T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b).
The holding of this case is only relevant to unlicensed contractors and
subcontractors who are dealing with other professionals, not property
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owners or private citizens. The holding is relevant to practicing attorneys
who represent contractors or attorneys who often deal with contractors
not licensed under T.C.A. § 62-6-103. It is also a cautionary tale for
contractors who choose to remain unlicensed in Tennessee. Although the
court allowed potential recovery of the unpaid invoices, the court
dismissed all other causes of action. Thus, it is important to be licensed.
For attorneys who represent clients that are knowingly unlicensed or
clients who may not comply with the strict licensing requirements, a
document-retention plan is of utmost importance, particularly after this
holding. If contractors miss out on work due to an issue with another
professional, they should get documentation of what they would have
made elsewhere. T.C.A. § 62-6-103(b) requires expenses be shown by
“clear and convincing proof,” so there is a chance that a court could
expand this to include broader damages than just unpaid invoices.
Unlicensed contractors can bring common law claims against another
professional so long as they have the necessary proof of damages.
Transactional attorneys need to advise contractors to get bids in writing
so there is additional proof of damages if the client were to miss out on
a job due to a legal claim against another professional.

